On the right track: building security and resilience into the railway before it leaves the station
At a glance
Digital signalling and connected operational systems are changing how Australian railways work, creating new dependencies that owners and delivery teams need to address. If cybersecurity requirements arrive too late, teams can face design changes, interface issues and additional assurance work when systems are already well developed.
This insight explores how bringing cybersecurity into the design process early can help teams manage these dependencies throughout delivery and into operation.
Digital rail brings new opportunities and new cyber risks
Across new and existing Australian rail networks, digital signalling, automated systems, connected trains and centralised traffic management are changing how railways operate. The opportunity is significant: greater capacity, more efficient operations and increasingly sophisticated ways of managing train movements.
But greater connectivity also changes the risk profile.
As information technology and operational technology become more connected, the pathways through which critical transport systems can be disrupted increase. This isn't unique to rail. The EU’s cybersecurity agency ENISA identifies IT and operational technology convergence, greater interconnection and the broader digital transformation of transport as factors changing the sector's cyber-risk profile.
For rail owners, operators and delivery partners, the question is shifting. Instead of asking “How do we secure the system?” we need to ask “How do we design security into the system from the outset?”
Rail is no longer just physical infrastructure
We naturally think about rail in terms of what we can see: tracks, stations, tunnels, trains and bridges.
Increasingly, however, the railway also depends on an invisible digital layer.
Signalling, communications, operational control systems and software all contribute to keeping trains moving safely and efficiently.
One example is the European Train Control System (ETCS), a digital signalling and train-control technology. Rather than relying only on traditional trackside signals, ETCS supports the exchange of information needed to manage train movements.
This brings considerable advantages, but it also means digital information, and the systems carrying it, become part of the railway’s operational integrity.
Rail cybersecurity needs to be viewed differently from conventional corporate IT security. It goes beyond protecting data, as it is becoming more connected to the safety, resilience and availability of the railway itself.
What happens when things go wrong?
In Poland in August 2023, unauthorised radio-stop signals were transmitted over railway frequencies in the country's northwest. Around 20 trains were halted, disrupting services. Reporting on the incident noted debate over whether it should technically be classified as a “cyberattack”, because the interference involved the railway's radio system rather than a conventional computer-network intrusion.
That distinction actually reinforces a broader lesson for modern rail.
Cyber resilience is not confined to laptops, servers or corporate IT. Railways depend on interconnected operational technologies and communications systems, some with much longer lifecycles than the digital technologies around them.
As rail becomes more connected, owners and operators need to understand those dependencies. They also need to consider how systems will behave not only under normal conditions, but when communications, data or digital services are compromised or unavailable.
Why waiting can become expensive
On a major infrastructure project, thousands of design decisions and interfaces develop across signalling, rolling stock, communications, power, stations and operational systems. If cybersecurity requirements aren't established early, they can conflict with those decisions later.
That can mean revisiting designs, changing interfaces, introducing additional controls or producing additional assurance evidence in systems that are already substantially developed. Leaving cybersecurity verification, validation and assurance until late in infrastructure integration can contribute to approval delays and increase costs.
Bringing cybersecurity into a project after major design decisions have been made tends to drive up cost.
The alternative is straightforward: treat cybersecurity as an engineering input, rather than a final compliance check.
Cybersecurity-in-design, not cybersecurity after design
For owners and delivery teams, this means introducing cybersecurity thinking while the railway is still taking shape.
Early in the lifecycle, teams can establish the cybersecurity management approach, understand critical assets and interfaces, define requirements and incorporate them into individual packages.
As the project develops, cybersecurity can then move through design, verification, validation and commissioning alongside the broader engineering program.
Authentication, encryption and intrusion prevention are all essential, but no single control takes priority. A common cybersecurity architecture and assurance approach must be set from the start for requirements to be designed and demonstrated systematically.
For a complex rail program, this is particularly important because responsibility rarely sits with one organisation or technology provider. Multiple systems have to work together, and the interfaces between them matter.
The challenge involves systems engineering and governance as much as cybersecurity technology.
The opportunity for Australia's next generation of rail
Australia's continued investment in digital rail gives the industry an opportunity to build cybersecurity into new and upgraded networks while they are still taking shape.
For owners and delivery teams, the first step is to identify the operational systems and digital dependencies that matter most. Teams should map how systems and suppliers connect, including the communication pathways they rely on, then use that picture to define cybersecurity requirements early in the program.
Those requirements then need to follow the project into procurement and design. Build them into individual packages and interfaces so suppliers understand what they need to address and what evidence they will need to provide.
As systems come together, teams should test how they respond if trusted information, communications or digital services become unavailable or compromised. Verification and validation can then develop alongside integration and commissioning, rather than becoming a late-stage exercise.
Cybersecurity also needs to continue beyond project delivery. Owners and operators should carry the requirements, evidence and understanding of system dependencies into operations so they can support the railway throughout its lifecycle.
The detail will differ from project to project.
The principle remains consistent.
If Australia's future rail networks are going to be digital by design, they also need to be secure by design. Cybersecurity is easier to engineer into a railway at the beginning than to retrofit once the train has already left the station.